CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL 

Arbitration

LaCour v. Marshalls of California (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3731034: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of a former employee plaintiff’s single-count PAGA action. In denying the motion, the trial court reasoned that “there is no such thing as an ‘individual PAGA claim’ ” that could be severed and compelled to arbitration. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that—based on ordinary contract-interpretation principles and the parties’ mutual intent when the arbitration agreement was signed in 2014—the arbitration agreement did not clearly reflect an agreement to arbitrate “individual PAGA claims,” so defendant was not entitled to compel arbitration notwithstanding Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 and related post-Viking River developments. (C.A. 1st, Dec. 24, 2025.)

Attorney Fees

Evleshin v. Meyer (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3101271: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Following a bench trial the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, the sellers of a Santa Cruz home, and found them to be the prevailing parties in a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs/buyers alleging breach of contract and fraud. In the purchase agreement the parties agreed to mediate if there was a dispute. If one party refused to mediate they would lose the right to recover attorney fees if they later prevailed. Based upon these provisions, the trial court denied defendants’ motion for attorney fees on the grounds that defendants had refused to mediate, and although they were the prevailing they had lost the ability to recover attorney fees. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the trial court erred in reading the contract’s mediation clause to impose a forfeiture where there was evidence in the record that could support a conclusion that while defendants’ initially declined to mediate, they re-opened the door to mediation before the lawsuit was filed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. If the trial court finds on remand that defendants retracted their initial refusal to mediate and expressed a willingness to mediate before the lawsuit was filed, the disentitlement provision in the contract would not apply. (C.A. 6th, November 6, 2025.)

Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc. (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3687544: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision sanctioning plaintiff for failing to comply with Civil Code section 55.54(d)(7) by refusing to disclose in his early-evaluation-conference statement the amount of attorney fees and costs he was claiming as of that time, and—after offering an alternative sanction of proceeding but not being able to recover attorney fees—dismissed the action with prejudice when plaintiff elected dismissal. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 55.54(d)(7)’s requirement to disclose claimed attorney fees and costs did not violate the attorney-client privilege (distinguishing the decision in Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282). It also concluded the trial court’s sanctions procedure did not violate due process. (C.A. 6th, December 19, 2025.)

Employment

Dobarro v. Kim (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3228546: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s appeal of a Labor Commissioner wage award to plaintiff because it was filed one day late. The trial court concluded the notice of appeal was untimely filed under Labor Code section 98.2. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the Labor Code section 98.2 deadlines for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for posting or seeking waiver of the undertaking are mandatory and jurisdictional, not subject to equitable tolling or the electronic-filing tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, rejected defendant’s other arguments as meritless, declined to impose sanctions but published the opinion to clarify the law. (C.A. 1st, November 19, 2025.)

Torts

Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3225067: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding for defendant, in a bench trial on the liability of defendant under the immunity provided in Vehicle Code section 17004.7, in plaintiff’s action for personal injuries suffered when her car was hit by another driver who was being followed by a city police officer. The trial court concluded that defendant’s written vehicular pursuit policy and training complied with the statute and the other driver Elijah Henry believed he was being pursued, thereby rendering defendant immune from liability for plaintiff’s injuries and entering judgment in defendant’s favor. The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that held the term “pursued” in section 17004.7(b)(1) must be given a single meaning derived from the vehicular pursuit definition in the public entity’s policy (including the requirement that the suspect be attempting to avoid arrest), and the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing Henry’s belief and improperly disregarded evidence that he did not think he was being pursued under that policy. The case was reversed and remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s the immunity claim under the correct standard. (C.A. 1st, November 19, 2025.)

Trial

McDonald v. Zargaryan (2025) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2025 WL 3704598: The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for plaintiff, following a jury trial, where the jury awarded plaintiff future medical expenses of $1,872,900, past pain and suffering of $2 million, and for future pain and suffering was $10 million. The issue in this case was the fact that plaintiff first went to see a surgeon, Dr. Toorag Gravori, the week before trial and 16 months after the exchange of expert information. Seven days before trial, counsel for plaintiff blindsided the defense with a new medical expert with a new medical theory. The trial court denied defendants’ motion in limine to exclude plaintiff’s late-disclosed medical expert, permitted the expert to testify after an expedited deposition, and the jury returned the substantial verdict above for plaintiff that the court reduced to judgment. The Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the surprise expert to testify despite plaintiff’s failure to timely disclose the expert or seek leave to augment the expert list and the absence of any reasonable justification for the eve-of-trial designation. The judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. (C.A. 2nd, December 22, 2025.)