CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

Civil Procedure

J.O. v. Super. Ct. (2026) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2026 WL 1488791: the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal decision summarily denying writ relief after the trial court denied petitioner’s objection to County Counsel’s alleged blanket Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 challenges to Judge Guy Castillo. The trial court denied the objection, concluding it was barred under Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 (Solberg) and the Court of Appeal summarily denied writ relief. The California Supreme Court overruled Solberg to the extent it immunized blanket abuses of section 170.6 from as-applied separation of powers challenges, holding that if a party makes a prima facie showing of bad faith blanket challenges, a court may look behind the section 170.6 affidavit and inquire into the legitimacy of the prejudice claim, and remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. Practitioner Takeaways: (1) Courts may now entertain separation of powers objections to alleged blanket section 170.6 challenges—the Solberg shield is gone; (2) a party opposing a section 170.6 motion must timely object and establish a prima facie case of bad faith blanket challenges using a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 style burden-shifting framework; (3) the separation of powers problem arises from the legislative scheme itself, meaning blanket abuses by any party—not just executive branch actors—may be challenged; and (4) the Legislature retains authority to amend section 170.6, and further statutory reform addressing blanket challenges remains a live possibility. (May 28, 2026.) 

CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL

Employment

Smith v. The Superior Court of Alameda County (2026) _ Cal.App.5th _ , 2026 WL 1876096: The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and granted a writ petition vacating the trial court’s order. Plaintiffs, who were former class members in Vaughn, et al. v. Tesla, Inc. (Super. Court Alameda County, 2017, No. RG17882082) (Vaughn), alleged, in five related complaints filed by 440 Tesla factory workers, that defendant Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) maintained a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and harassment at its factory and systematically failed to investigate or address it, in violation of FEHA. The trial court found misjoinder and ordered that, in each of five related complaints filed by 440 former Tesla factory workers, all plaintiffs except the first-named must be dismissed and refiled individually. The Court of Appeal disagreed and held the claims were properly joined under Code of Civil Procedure section 378 because they arose from a common corporate policy or practice, and that section 379.5 did not authorize the trial court to dismiss properly joined plaintiffs based on manageability, judicial economy, or filing-fee concerns. Practitioner Takeaways: Section 378 joinder is construed liberally—a defendant’s common policy or practice causing harm to plaintiffs at different times/locations can satisfy the “same transaction or occurrence” test without identical individual facts. Manageability, judicial economy, and filing-fee shortfalls are not grounds for misjoinder under section 378; courts may only address them post-joinder (e.g., severed trials under section 379.5), and broader limits must come from the Legislature. A related case’s class-decertification findings don’t bind differently-represented individual plaintiffs from establishing proper joinder in follow-on suits. Federal Rule 21 has no California counterpart, so federal mass-joinder dismissals under Rule 21 carry little weight in section 378/379.5 analysis. (C.A. 1st, June 30, 2026.)